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Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 s 27(1) – duty of respondent to give 
information and documents - scope of obligation – implications for compulsory 
conference and exchange of mandatory final offers 
 
In Hare v Mount Isa City Council [2009] QDC 39 McGill DCJ examined the scope of s 
27(1) of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (“the Act”) and its interpretation 
by the Court of Appeal in Haug v Jupiters Ltd [2008] 1 Qd R 276.  
 
Facts 
 
On 24 April 2004 a Part 1 notice of claim under the Act was given on behalf of the 
applicant by her mother to five respondents, including Mount Isa City Council, who was 
the respondent to the application before the Court (“the respondent”). 
 
The applicant alleged that she has suffered injury in the form of “learning difficulties due to 
poor attention and concentration span, developmental delay, hyperactivity and irritability, 
loss of appetite, hearing and sight problems.” In providing a brief description of “the 
incident”, the notice of claim stated: 
“The injured person (Stella) has lived in Mount Isa with her mother since June 
2002. During this time, she has, without her knowledge or consent, been exposed to 
and consequently absorbed into her body dangerous levels of lead, arsenic, 
cadmium and other toxic elements (“the toxins”). Exposure to the toxins has 
occurred at [three specified locations] from June 2002 to the present. The 
absorption by Stella of these toxins has had a deleterious effect upon her health 
generally and in particular upon her brain and nerve function and development.” 
 
The date of incident was given as “2002 to present”, and the place where the incident 
occurred as “Mount Isa”. 
 
In setting out the reasons why the injured person believed that particular persons, including 
the respondent, caused the incident, it was alleged that another respondent had over at least 
20 years, and in various ways, wilfully and negligently caused the contamination of large 
parts of Mount Isa with lead and other toxic elements. It was then alleged that the Council 
had been aware of this but had failed to do take a number of specified steps it ought to have 
taken, such as to warn members of the community, to identity at-risk subgroups in the 
community, and to develop an environmental management plan for the reduction of 
environmental lead and other toxic element exposure from all significant sources.   
 
It was further alleged that the Council had approved for residential use land that it knew or 
ought to have known was contaminated with lead and other toxic elements and therefore 
was hazardous to residents. The notice did not identify which land was involved in this 
way.  
 
The application before the Court sought a number of orders, including an order requiring 
the respondent to comply with its duty under s 27 of the Act (Duty of respondent to give 
documents and information to claimant). 
 
The respondent had already provided a list of documents, and the primary dispute between 
the parties related to the scope of the obligation under s 27. The applicant sought in the 
alternative, however, an order dispensing with the requirement for a compulsory 
conference and exchange of mandatory final offers.   
 
 
Legislation 
 
Section 27 of the Act provides, so far as relevant:  
“27 Duty of respondent to give information and documents 
(1) A respondent must give a claimant— 
(a) copies of the following in the respondent’s possession that are directly relevant to a 
matter in issue in the claim— 
(i) reports and other documentary material about the incident alleged to have given rise to 
the personal injury to which the claim relates;... 
 
“Incident” is defined in the Schedule to the Act as: “‘incident’ in relation to personal 
injury, means the accident or other act, omission or circumstance alleged to have caused all 
or part of the personal injury. 
 
Submissions 
 
The applicant submitted that the effect of the obligation under s 27(1)(a)(i) was to provide 
copies of documents “about the incident” that are “directly relevant to a matter in issue in 
the claim.” It was apparent from the notice of claim that the applicant’s allegation was that 
she had suffered personal injury caused by omissions on the part of the respondent, and 
acts of the respondent in the form of approving land for residential use which it knew or 
ought to have known was contaminated.  
 
The applicant submitted that the obligation under s 27(1)(a)(i) was to provide documents 
about those acts and omissions that were directly relevant to a matter in issue in the claim. 
Since liability has been denied, whether the defendant was liable was a matter in issue in 
the claim. 
 
It was submitted that the obligation was therefore broad enough to extend to documents 
such as those relevant to the state of knowledge of the respondent about the existence of 
contamination of lead and other heavy metals within Mount Isa, those relevant to showing 
what the respondent had done over a long period of time in response to that knowledge, and 
documents about the approval for residential use of the relevant land or the state of 
knowledge of the respondent at the time of such approval. 
 
For the respondent, it was submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Haug v 
Jupiters Ltd [2008] 1 Qd R 276 supported a confined interpretation of the respondent’s 
obligation to disclose, and that the focus should be on the particular circumstances under 
which the claimant came to suffer the injuries. This followed from the requirement that the 
reports and other documentary material be “about” the incident, rather than merely being 
relevant to the question of whether there was negligence on the part of the respondent in 
the way alleged by the claimant.  
 
This meant the incident must be comprised of a body of fact which is, in effect, the 
happening or occurrence of the injury, and that necessarily connotes a defined set of 
circumstances with a particular time and place (or times and places), and particular 
happenings.  The respondent submitted that it was necessary to focus on the process by 
which injury was caused to the claimant.  
 
Analysis 
 
McGill DCJ examined the decision in Haug v Jupiters Limited [2008] 1 Qd R 276. That 
case involved an appeal from a decision ordering various documents to be disclosed under 
s 27(1) of the Act. The respondent had given a notice of claim alleging that he suffered an 
injury as a result of the actions of security staff at the respondent’s casino. It was alleged 
that the appellant had been negligent in various ways, including failing to engage 
reasonably competent security guards, and authorising or permitting the security guards to 
restrain the complainant with the use of unreasonable and excessive force. The notice of 
claim foreshadowed issues about the adequacy of the training of the security guards, and 
whether the appellant had been guilty of relevant omissions in relation to the engaging of 
security guards.  
 
It was concluded, however, that a range of documentation sought, such as that  relating to 
the training of the guards at the Casino, or to security cameras, or to prior claims about 
excessive or inappropriate use of force by security guards at the casino, did not relate to the 
incident. Rather, they related to the causes of the incident, and this was not within the scope 
of the obligation in s 27(1)(a)(i).  
 
McGill DCJ noted there was a factual difference between the situation in Haug and the 
matter before him, because the notice of claim in Haug identified a specific event in which 
the claimant suffered injury. The judge thought, however, that the equivalent in the notice 
of claim in the matter before him was the process of absorption of lead and other heavy 
metals alleged to have been experienced by the claimant between July 2002 and the time 
when the notice was given. 
 
The judge found that if the argument advanced on behalf of the applicant were correct, the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Haug would have been different. He said that some or 
all of the documents about the selection and training of security guards would have been 
held to have been within the scope of s 27(1)(a)(i). He said it followed that the applicant’s 
argument was not consistent with the decision of the Court of Appeal, and must therefore 
be rejected. 
 
By analogy with the decision in Haug, McGill DCJ concluded s 27(1)(a)(i) required 
disclosure of  documentary material in the respondent’s possession about the absorption by 
the applicant of lead and other heavy metals from July 2002 until the time when the notice 
of claim was given.  
 
The obligation did not extend to disclosing all documents relevant to whether the Council 
knew, over a long period of time, of contamination of all or part of Mount Isa by lead or 
other heavy metals, and the respondent’s reaction to that. There being no suggestion that 
the obligation, as so interpreted, had not been complied with, the relief sought in the first 
limb of the application was refused.  
 
In relation to the alternative relief sought, the applicant submitted there was no point in 
having the compulsory conference or exchanging mandatory final offers as she could not 
realistically assess her prospects of success, and therefore engage in meaningful settlement 
negotiations, without the further material requested. McGill DCJ was not persuaded by this 
argument. He said there was no reason to suggest the legislature intended these procedures 
to apply only where the parties had complete knowledge of everything which would be 
before a court at trial. The judge also noted that the respondent to the application was not 
the only respondent to the notice of claim. He thought the prospect of settlement between 
the claimant and other respondents might be jeopardised if the respondent to the application 
was not a party to the compulsory conference process. Accordingly, the alternative relief 
sought by the application was also refused. 
 
 
Comment 
 
His Honour expressed a number of concerns about the Act and the Regulation made under 
it, that are worthy of consideration by the Legislature. The first of these was that the 
legislation and the subordinate legislation tends to proceed upon the assumption that 
liability for personal injury arises by way of a specific injury caused on a particular 
occasion in a particular event. This is reflected in the wording of the form for the notice of 
claim, and in the drafting of s 27.  
 
As he observed, this is the way liability ordinarily arises, but that it can arise in a wide 
variety of other circumstances. He said it is difficult to apply the concept of direct 
relevance of documents to an omission to do something, unless the omission was the result 
of a specific, deliberate, and documented decision not to do it. The applicant’s case against 
the respondent here appeared to be that over a long period of time circumstances existed 
such that it was appropriate for the respondent to do something, but the respondent did not 
do it. A case of this nature does not fit readily within the framework contemplated by the 
legislation. 
 
The judge was also concerned that s 31 of the Act makes the failure to disclose in 
accordance with the requirement to s 27 a criminal offence. He said it is undesirable if an 
obligation, the failure to comply with which is vested with criminal penalties, is not 
expressed in terms which enable the person subject to the obligation to know clearly and 
distinctly, in all cases in which the obligation can arise, just what has to be done in order to 
enable the obligation to be performed. It was necessarily unsatisfactory for there to be any 
ambiguity about the scope of the obligation under s 27.  
 
Finally, there was the consideration that, if a wide scope was given to an obligation such as 
that under s 27 of the Act, a very onerous burden may be placed on a particular respondent 
in particular circumstances, simply because someone has given a Notice of a Claim under 
the Act. 
